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Federal land management policy is often portrayed as agencies being in the middle between 
environmentalists on one side and industry on the other. Agency officials sometimes feel they must be 
performing a balanced act, when  both sides think the agency has not gone far enough in their direction. 
But this approach has frequently resulted in gridlock, with both sides appealing agency decisions and 
suing the agency.  
 
One of the new institutional changes in federal land management designed to reduce this gridlock is 
allowing selected National Forests, Monuments and Preserves to be formally managed by local grass 
roots groups in one form or another rather than solely by federal agencies. There have been three recent 
legislative experiments in grass roots local control. The first discussed is the Quincy Library Group in 
northern California, which obtained a Congressional act to replace the U.S. Forest Service's Forest Plan 
with their community’s plan for the Plumas National Forest. Second, is the Valles Caldera National 
Preserve (formerly the private Baca Ranch) in northern New Mexico. While federal taxpayers across the 
nation paid $100 million for acquisition of the 89,000 acres, the long term direction and day-to-day 
management will be by a board of local trustees, rather than any of the federal land management 
agencies that manage the surrounding lands. Third, is the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management 
and Protected Area in eastern Oregon. Here twelve locals will serve on the Steens Mountain Advisory 
Council and formulate recommendations for the federal Bureau of Land Management to implement.  
 
This essay will use the Quincy Library Group as a case study to provide some commentary as to the 
concerns regarding this institutional change to grass roots federal land management.  The number of 
local management examples may double if President Bush's proposed "Charter Forests" are adopted and 
oversight is granted to local trusts rather than the federal U.S. Forest Service. One of the goals is to spare 
these charter forests from having to comply with environmental procedures such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act.  
 
These shifts to local control run counter to another major trend in public land management—ecosystem 
management. Putting what were private lands purchased by U.S. taxpayers for the Valles Caldera 
National Preserve  under  local  control,  rather  than  transferring management to one of the federal land 
management agencies, makes ecosystem management more difficult. That is, acquisition of private lands 
at the headwaters of the Jemez River was an opportunity to facilitate ecosystem management with the 
U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management lands. Despite public acquisition, the coordination 
task among landowners has not been simplified.  
 
It is worth noting that what is at stake in these precedent setting experiments is a transition from 
accountability of federal land managers to all the publics (local and non local residents) of the nation to 
one of local control of a federal asset and the federal treasury. Federal agencies have had requirements 
since 1969 through the National Environmental Policy Act’s (NEPA) requirements to prepare 
Environmental Impact Statements along with the associated requirements of public notification and public 
comment periods. The National Forest Management Act of 1976 and Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 both require extensive public involvement in plan scoping, public comment on 
plan alternatives, and selection of the final management for the National Forest or BLM area. There have 
long been established avenues for local residents to directly participate in land management planning. 
Local residents  have always h ad significant input in influencing National Forest and BLM plans and 
decisions due to their proximity to the federal land management offices in their towns and the fact that 
public meetings were frequently only held in these towns. However, the locals did not have a monopoly 
on public input, as letters from those living outside the area still have to be considered in a NEPA 
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analysis. Often times hundreds of letters would be received from outside the area providing a formal voice 
to non-local residents. With these three grass roots experiments, locals have legally institutionalized their 
influence in calling the shots on these federal lands, but not in paying the bills.  This essay attempts to 
shed some light on whether this institutional change will lead to more efficient public land management 
than current federal agency management.  
 
Quincy Library Group’s Rise from 
Local Stakeholders to De-facto National 
Forest Supervisors 
 
Like many National Forests, policy and legal gridlock was the state of affairs on the Plumas and Lassen 
National Forests  in  the  late   1980’s  and  early   1990’s.   Local environmentalists concerned about old 
growth forests and the California Spotted Owl were appealing U.S. Forest Service timber sales aimed at 
providing timber to local mills to support employment. As a result, timber production was falling. This 
statemate led Plumas County Supervisor Bill  Coates  to  bring  the  two  main  adversaries  (a  local 
environmental attorney and the director of Sierra Pacific Industries) t ogether directly (Davis and King, 
2001). These three agreed it would be more productive to try and develop a compromise, rather than fight 
each other (Mann and Plummer, 1998). The name of the group arises from the fact that the Quincy public 
library was a  neutral place all the groups could find to meet. The U.S. Forest Service personnel attended 
the meeting but only as observers.   
 
It took nearly two years and dozens of meetings, but the participants agreed upon a forest management 
plan that accommodated e nvironmental concerns, while providing some timber for industry. The U.S. 
Forest Service not only supported the ideas of the Quincy Library Group’s plan but was willing to back it 
administratively by requesting funding from Congress for selected projects in the Group’s plan (Davis and 
King, 2001). However, the agency would not support formally amending the National Forest Plans to 
include all the specific recommendations of the Quincy Library Group (Davis and King, 2001). Therefore, 
the Group sought Congressional endorsement of its management recommendations. In the House of 
Representatives the Quincy Library Group's Forest Recovery and Economic Stability Act was passed in 
1998 by a nearly unanimous vote (U.S. House of Representatives. 1998). In May of 1998  the Senate 
version was attached as a rider to a federal spending bill by one of California’s senators (Feinstein). With 
the help of California Representative Herger, the bill survived, was signed by President Clinton and 
became known as the Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act.  
 
The bill requires the U.S. Forest Service to manage 2.25 million acres of land in the two National Forests 
according to the Quincy Library Group’s plan for a period of five years (Davis and King, 2001). The Act 
requires the U.S. Forest Service to follow all existing environmental laws. However the Group’s plan 
departs from what had been the U.S. Forest Service standard timber practices of clearcutting in favor of 
single tree and group-selection (U.S. Senate, 1997).  Timber production activities are to be coordinated 
with construction of fuel breaks on 40,000 to 60,000 acres of land to address concerns over fire hazards 
to forests and homeowners in the area (Davis, 2001). Clearing timber to create large swaths of  bare 
ground to prevent the spread of wildfire is a nice example of joint production: meeting two land 
management objectives (fire prevention and timber volume) with one coordinated management action.  
 
An important precedent set by the Quincy Library Group is to significantly rearrange the institutional 
pattern of federal land management. No longer would resource professionals formulate management 
practices to address the issues raised by the public and resource professionals with state and other 
federal agencies. No longer would these agency plans be  reviewed for consistency with national 
direction and then funds requested from Congress to implement the plan. The Quincy Library Group 
model starts with locals identifying the problem and formulating the alternative management plans. The 
locals then directly petition Congress to adopt their plan and ask the U.S. taxpayer to fund the U.S. Forest 
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Economic Concerns About Grass Roots 
Federal Land Management 
 
This new institutional rearrangement presents several concerns. While local residents of course have 
local knowledge of the area and resources, they may lack the multi-disciplinary and technical planning 
expertise to make sure their plans are feasible. Simply summing all the outputs that each group records 
on meeting flip charts does not provide any test of whether the land is capable of sustainably supplying 
these outputs. The U.S. Forest Service's previous Forest Plans involved use of a linear programming 
model that was designed to ensure that any alternative was within the sustained yield capability of the 
forest over a 50 year planning horizon.  
 
The second concern is one of differences in accounting stances between those who live in Quincy and 
can repeatedly travel to local meetings and those who reside throughout California and the western U.S. 
Do local citizens of Quincy have the incentives to adequately represent all the citizens affected by 
management of the natural resources on this National Forest? While the  local citizens in attendance 
represent those affected the most per person, aggregate effects require consideration of the total number 
of people affected. While the 10 million San Francisco Bay area and Central Valley residents may have 
less at stake per person, the sum of these small effects per person can potentially exceed that of the few 
local citizens seated in the Quincy Library.  
 
One of the rationales for the federal management is that it would account for the public good benefits 
accruing to the nation (Loomis, 2002). An empirical example of the difference in benefits per person 
versus the aggregate can illustrate this important distinction. The Plumas and Lassen National Forests 
are habitat to the California Spotted Owl and therefore the concern about the management of these 
National Forests potentially has national implications. An empirical study by Loomis and Gonzalez-Caban 
(1997) found that households as far away as New England would pay $46 (with a 90% confidence 
interval of $41-50) per household each year for protection of the California Spotted Owl habitat. California 
households would pay $79. While the amount that each California household would pay is nearly double 
that of a typical New England household and California is the most populous state in the nation, the state 
benefits of protecting the California Spotted Owl represent only 17% of the national benefits (Loomis, 
2000). The omission of benefits of rare species would be even more pronounced if we calculated the 
benefits just to Plumas County households. This pattern of greater national than  local benefits for public 
goods compares with the local job benefits from timber production. The vast majority of these local timber 
production benefits accrue to Plumas County in the form of direct wages and indirect multiplier effects. 
Yet from the national viewpoint, such jobs are transfers of economic activity that would occur somewhere 
else in the nation if not in Plumas County. When the local economy captures nearly all the benefits from 
extraction of private goods, but would receive only a fraction of the public good benefits from habitat 
protection, it is not unexpected that extraction wins out over public goods.  
 
Equally important is the fact that it is the 100 million taxpayers throughout the U.S. that will pay for the 
U.S. Forest Service’s implementation of the Quincy Library Group’s plan.  Thus, members of the Quincy 
Library Group have incentives to act like any other special interest: maximize their concentrated benefits 
and spread the costs out over the general public such that the costs per taxpayer are so small, they are 
unnoticeable (Gardner, 1983, 1997;  Stroup and Baden, 1983). Whether this is an improvement over 
industry special interests' concentration of benefits and spreading of cost is an empirical question.  
 
Some Final Observations 
 
While the old guard of the Sagebrush Rebellion might support these local control efforts, their intellectual 
supporters might not. That is, while one might suspect on the surface that free market economists might 
support these local control efforts, if they are true to their principles, I am not sure these efforts would be 
what free market economists had in mind. In particular, local control was to be the merging of authority 
with the economic responsibility for managing the lands. But these local control efforts have the authority, 
while the federal taxpayer still has the financial responsibility for paying for the variable costs of managing 
these lands (except in the case of the Valles Caldera where they are supposed to be financially self-
sufficient in 15 years). With two of these local control efforts, there is still a divergence between the   4
authority to determine what management practices occur on the land and the responsibility to bear the 
costs of those actions. Whether this divergence results in public land management actions that better 
maximize net benefits to the public than federal agency management is a testable hypothesis. 
Specifically, what is needed is a comparison of traditional federal land management and grass roots 
management  on variables such as net benefits "to whomsoever they accrue", as well as environmental 
indicators such as water quality or population trends of threatened and endangered species. These three 
experiments in grass roots federal land management provide economists with three natural experiments 
that may provide the empirical data to test this hypothesis.  
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